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LCM ENTERPRISES V TOWN OF DARTMOUTH:
CAN RECREATIONAL MARINERS PROTECT
THEIR RIGHT TO NAVIGATE?
William K. Terrillt
It's Official. The US. Coast Guard's recommended equipment
list has been revised. Now, in addition to anchors, fire ec-
tinguishers, emergency signals and personal floatation devices,
American boaters are advised to pack a lawyer.1
I. INTRODUCTION
As the popularity of recreational boating increases,' mariners face
coastal communities that are becoming inhospitable to recreational
boaters.' A major source of this feeling of inhospitability comes from
the communities' implementation of anchorage and waterway use fees.
Mariners charge that these municipal fees discourage public navigation
of coastal waters.' Waterside communities contend that the fees are valid
police power regulations, helping to meet the increasing cost of harbor
maintenance.5  Within the boating community, however, mariners
maintain that such fees are an exclusionary means to preserve the
waterways for local residential use' or are an improper tax to provide
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1997.
1. Bob Wiemer, Boaters' New Problem: No Parking Zones, Newsday (Nassau and
Suffolk ed.), Feb. 15, 1993, at 32.
2. In 1991, over sixteen million recreational vessels existed in the United States.
Thomas A. Russell & Mitchell F. Ducey, Current Topics in the Law of Recreational
Boating, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 107, 109 (1992) (citing National Marine Manufacturers
Ass'n, 1991 BOATING 8, (1991)).
3. Wiemer, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
6. See supra note 1.
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income for the town.' Some of these navigational fees raise questions
concerning state and municipal authority to regulate navigable waters of
the United States.
In LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth,8 a federal circuit court
upheld a waterways use fee9 schedule that charged nonresident boat
owners a fee more than double that charged to resident boaters, thereby
establishing a disparate fee structure. 10 Dartmouth enacted the waterway
fee after the town's Harbor Committee reported that an increasing
number of nonresident, recreational boaters were using Dartmouth's
7. Memorandum in Support of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at
13-15, LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WD (D. Mass. Apr. 27,
1993).
8. 14 F.3d 675 (lst Cir. 1994).
9. The ordinance does not define "use." The district court relied on the testimony
of Dartmouth's harbormaster for a definition and application of the fee. A use fee is
"imposed upon boat owners who maintain boats for periods of time in the Dartmouth
waterways." LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WD,
Memorandum and Order at 2 n.2 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 1993).
10. The owner of each boat, who maintains the boat(s) for a period of time in the
Dartmouth waterways is assessed a fee in accordance with the following use fee
schedule:
(1) For residents of Dartmouth:
(a) $20 for boats 12 to 16 feet in length;
(b) $35 for boats 17 to 30 feet in length;
(c) $35 for the first 30 feet plus $1 per each additional foot for boats
greater than 30 feet in length.
(2) For nonresidents of Dartmouth:
(a) $50 for boats 12 to 16 feet in length;
(b) $100 for boats 17 to 30 feet in length;
(c) $100 for the first 30 feet plus $1.50 per each additional foot for boats
greater than 30 feet in length.
A resident is defined as one or more of the following:
A voter registered in the Town.
A person who is domiciled in the Town.
A person who pays real estate taxes to the Town.
A spouse or dependent of any of the above.
LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 677 (quoting Dartmouth, Mass.
Amend. to Dartmouth GEN. BY-LAWS Art. IV, § 19B (25) (May 7, 1991)).
On its face, the ordinance applies to commercial and recreational vessels. The town
harbormaster, however, testified that the fee is not charged to commercial vessels.
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at
3, LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WD (D. Mass. Apr. 27,
1993).
LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth
harbor and waterways." The town contended that the fee's purpose was
to equalize the burden of municipal costs for the provision of services
and maintenance to the harbor and waterways.' Dartmouth argued that
increased use of the harbor by recreational boaters necessitated more
money to be spent for maintenance and repair. For example, the cost of
operating the Padanaram Bridge increased due to the number of openings
required to accommodate recreational boaters.'
In LCM Enterprises, Plaintiffs were boat owners who challenged the
disparate fee structure on three separate constitutional grounds:' 4 the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the
Commerce Clause, and federal preemption under the Supremacy clause.
The district court dismissed all four constitutional challenges. In the
case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that Dartmouth's
disparate treatment of nonresidents did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment because the fee was rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.'" The First Circuit stated that it was unable to consider
arguments based on the Commerce Clause argument because the district
court had concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing under the
Commerce Clause-a fact conceded by the plaintiffs at oral argument.16
This Note will first describe the two elements of the federal power
over navigation in public navigable waters. Second, this Note will
examine the authority of coastal states to control submerged lands and
the adjacent water column, and the state and local authority to regulate
within these waters. This Note will also examine both federal and state
court decisions upholding disparate mooring fee ordinances and statutes
in order to determine whether LCM Enterprises is consistent with this
body of case law.
11. Defendants Verified Statement of Facts on Behalf of the Defendants at 2, LCM
Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 9113129-WD (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 1993).
12. Id.
13. Id. Prior to the enactment of the fee, the town paid for these costs out of its
general fund. Id.
14. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2,
LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 911312-WD (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 1993).
The plaintiffs did not challenge the imposition of the fee, but rather the differential fee
structure. Id. at 8.
15. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 675, 682 (1st Cir. 1994).
The court discussed and dismissed the equal protection and due process arguments at the
same time and upon the same legal grounds. Id. at 678-683.
16. LCMEnterprisesv. TownofDartmouth, 14F.3dat683, n.14. The court also
determined that the town's action was not preempted by federal law. Id at 683-684.
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In LCM Enterprises, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's holding, permitting coastal municipalities to levy disparate
waterway use fees against nonresident recreational boaters. Prior to
LCM Enterprises, disparate fee structures for the use of the navigable
waterways had not been subject to a legal challenge. This Note contends
that LCM Enterprises, based upon the plaintiffs' arguments, is a
principled decision. However, the outcome might have been different if
the plaintiffs had focused their arguments on the right to navigate and on
the federal power over navigation, both grounded in the Commerce
Clause.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL POWER
OVER NAVIGATION
A. The Federal Government's Constitutional Authority to Regulate
Navigable Waters and Protect the Public Right of Navigation
1. The Federal Navigational Servitude
Federal and state courts and the United States Congress recognize
and protect the public right of navigation.'7 The United States Supreme
Court in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs characterized
17. See Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1913)
("flf, as must be the case, the title of the owner of the bed of navigable waters holds
subject absolutely to the public right of navigation....'; LCM Enterprises v. Town of
Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 683 ("Appellants are correct in their observation that navigable
waters of the United States are public property and cannot be obstructed or impeded so
as to impair their right to navigation." (emphasis added)); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179
U.S. 141, 163 (1900) (riparian owners hold only a "qualified title, a bare technical title
... to be held at all times subordinate to such use of the submerged lands and of the
waters flowing over them as may be consistent with or demanded by the public right of
navigation." (emphasis added)); Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1994)
(designating navigation as a "constitutional purpose"); Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S.
396, 411-412 (1893) ("Waters . . . form[ing] a waterway to other States or foreign
nations, cannot be obstructed or impeded as to impair, defeat or place any burden upon
a right to their navigation .... " (emphasis added)). See also Eva H. Morreale, Federal
Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3
NAT. REsouRcEs J. 1, 9-12 (1963) (discussing governmental use of the federal
navigational servitude to protect the public right to navigate).
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it as a "dominant right."18 In Gibbons v. Ogden,9 the Court established
federal authority over navigation as part of the government's commerce
power.' ° This federal power over navigation is intended to prevent state,
local or private parties from obstructing or monopolizing public
navigable waterways. 21
The federal navigational power is held in two distinct ways. First,
the federal government maintains a regulatory power over navigation.
In Gilman v. Philadelphia,z' the Court announced that:
Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate com-
merce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the
extent necessary, of all navigable waters of the United States
which are accessible from a State other than those in which they
lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation,
and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress.'
Second, the federal government holds a dominant navigational servitude.
This servitude contains two elements. First, the servitude protects public
access to and use of navigable waters' of the United States. Second, the
18. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. at 87. The Court
states: "If the public right to navigation is the dominant right and if, as must be the case,
the title of the owner of the bed of navigable waters holds subject absolutely to the public
right of navigation, this dominant right must include the right to use the bed of the water
for every purpose which is in aid of navigation. This right to control, improve and
regulate the navigation of such waters is one of the greatest of the powers delegated to
the United States by the power to regulate commerce." Id.
19. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have the power... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes ...."
21. Dorothy A. Tom, Kaiser Aetna v. United States: Private Property Rights In A
Navigable Marina, 2 U. HAw. L. REv. 589, 592 (1980-1981).
22. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
23. Id. at 724-25 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
24. 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1994). Navigable waters of the United States are generally
defined as "those waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are
presently used, or have beenused in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport
interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
Case law states, "[waters] are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used [as] ... a continued highway over which commerce is or may
be carried on with other States or foreign countries ... ." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
However, the term may have different meanings. The United States Supreme Court
1996]
172 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:167
servitude power permits the federal government to take either riparian or
littoral private property without compensating the owner,' and to declare
state-erected structures, or, presumably, state-promulgated regulations or
laws, to be impermissible obstructions to navigable waterways." Is it
not the role of the judiciary to decide whether this federal declaration or
taking will "improve" or "protect" navigation.' Whether the govern-
mental use of the servitude accomplishes one of these purposes is a
legislative determination. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he
decision of Congress that this project will serve the interests of
navigation involves engineering and policy considerations for Congress
and Congress alone to evaluate. Courts should respect that decision until
and unless it is shown to 'involve an impossibility[,]'" and that "[i]f the
interests of navigation are served, it is constitutionally irrelevant that
other purposes may also be advanced."' The courts offer great
deference to governmental programs claiming to improve or protect
navigation. This broad view of the servitude power presumably permits
the government to utilize the servitude for projects which only inciden-
tally benefit navigation."
The geographic reach of the servitude, however, is not coextensive
with the federal regulatory power.' In Kaiser Aetna, the United States
Supreme Court drew a geographic distinction between the reach of the
navigational servitude and the federal regulatory power.3 The majority
stated that, "the purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked, must be
considered. Thus, the meaning of the term depends on the context in which it is used."
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 169 (1979) (quoting United States v.
Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 49 (D. Haw. 1976)).
25. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 88 (1913).
26. Murphy v. Dep't of Nat. Resources, 837 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (S.D. Fla.
1993).
27. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956).
28. Id.
29. Morreale, supra note 17, at 11.
30. See Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489, 1495 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United
States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122 (1967) (unlike Congress' power to regulate for the
purpose for navigation, the servitude may not extend above the high water mark); United
States v. Great River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960) (navigational servitude,
unlike regulatory power, does not cover non-navigable tributaries). See also infra notes
32-34 and accompanying text. See generally Morreale, supra note 17, at 20, 31-63.
31. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (holding that the
federal government's use of the navigational servitude to create public access to a
privately owned marina, artificially connected to the navigable waters of the United
LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth
stated, "this Court's cases dealing with the authority of Congress to
regulate navigation and the so called 'navigation servitude' cannot be
simply lumped into one basket" and that "'[a]ny reliance upon judicial
precedent must be predicated upon careful appraisal of the purpose for
which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked in a particular case.'" '
According to the Court, the navigational servitude may not be extended
to waterways which are not navigable in fact in their natural state.33 The
Kaiser Aetna Court also made clear that the servitude does not extend to
privately held, artificially improved waters. 4  Thus, the geographic
scope of Congress' authority to regulate navigation is broader than the
reach of the navigational servitude.
The navigational servitude is a federal governmental power.
However, Marks v. Whitney35 indicates that private parties may invoke
the servitude as a means to protect public access and use of navigable
waters. The Marks court granted a defendant standing to request the
court to recognize and declare a public trust easement across the
plaintiff's tidelands.36 The court found Whitney to have standing as a
member of the affected general public,' even though the state maintained
States would effectuate a compensable taking).
Artificially improved waters are subject to federal navigation regulations. For
example, the government may enforce the rules of the road and require that running
lights be displayed in accordance with federal regulations. Id. at 174.
32. Id. at 170-171 (quoting United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. at 49).
33. Id. at 175, 178-179.
34. One commentator notes that the Kaiser Aetna decision "is understandable on
policy grounds. The free access required for the preservation of commercial trade and
fishing in England and during the early days of America is a far cry from the free access
of pleasure boating, rafting, swimming, and other recreational uses." Amy Kelley-
Pittman, Constitutional Foundations of Federal Water Laws, in WATEIS AND WATER
RIGHTS, § 35.02(c)(2), 148 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).
35. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
36. Id. at 381. See Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d at 1492-1495 (discussing the
difference between the public trust doctrine and the public navigational servitude). See
also Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 426-427 (1989).
Under the public trust doctrine, members of the general public are given certain rights
in state waters. States hold submerged lands and waters in trust for the traditional public
purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishing. Id. at 426 n.6. Full discussion of the
public trust doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note.
37. The court listed a number of cases whereby members of the public were
permitted to bring actions as members of the public. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d at
381 (citing Dietz v. King, 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970) (permitting members of the public
1996]
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complete jurisdiction and authority over the tidelands at issue.3" While
the courts have never expressly discussed a private party's ability to rely
upon the navigational servitude, Marks suggests that a mariner facing an
obstruction to navigation39 might have standing to assert the navigational
servitude it public navigational access or use is also obstructed.'
Both the power to regulate and the two components of the naviga-
tional servitude protect the public right to navigation.41 The Commerce
Clause embodies these guardians of navigation. Thus, legal challenges
involving the right to navigate must rely upon the broad, navigational
elements within the Commerce Clause.
to bring an action to enforce the public right to use a beach access route); Morse v. E.A.
Robby & Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1963) (enabling public citizens to bring an action to
quiet title to private and public easements in a public beach); Alameda Conservation
Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087, 1095-1098 (9th Cir. 1971) (allowing public citizens
to bring an action to enjoin improper filling of a bay and secure a general declaration of
the rights of the people to the waterways and wildlife areas of the bay).
38. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d at 378 n.1. The state legislature, as the
administrator and controller of public uses and the public trust lands, traditionally acts
as the authority to affect public rights and uses in the tidelands. The court stated, "[i]n
the absence of state or federal action the court may not bar members of the public from
lawfully asserting or exercising public trust rights on this privately owned tidelands."
Id. at 381.
While recognizing standing, the California Supreme Court refused to rule upon the
merits of the case. Ruling for one of the parties to the case would affect the status of
the public rights and uses within the tidelands, a purely political power. Thus, the court
remanded the case to the trial court. Id.
39. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
40. However, other precedent indicates that the courts might view the navigational
servitude solely as a governmental power. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 272
(1897) (deferring to congressional findings that a project is in aid of navigation, even
though "structures deemed by Congress to be in aid of navigation might in fact be in
obstruction of certain methods of navigation .... ") Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1314(1994) (federal government retention of the navigational servitude). See generally
Morreale, supra note 17, at 1-77. Throughout the entire article, the author does not cite
a single case or discuss the ability of a private party to assert the navigational servitude.
Id.
At a minimum, however, members of the general public may directly affect the
government's assertion of the servitude. The government may rely upon the servitude
subsequent to public complaint of an obstruction to public access or use of navigable
waters. Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d at 1492 (government assertion of the
navigational servitude following the denial of public access to the improved waters).
41. See supra note 17.
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2. The "Dormant" Navigational Servitude
In Boone v. United States,42 the Army Corps of Engineers argued
that a "dormant navigational servitude" protected the public right of
access to a walled fish pond.43 The court, however, refused to apply the
argument to the pond, which had been navigable at one time prior to a
private development. In dismissing the argument, the court never stated
that the dormant navigational servitude did not exist, but only concluded
that it was inapplicable to the matter before the court. Thus, the Boone
court did not expressly state that the argument could never be brought
forward to protect public access to and use of navigable waters."
B. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953: State Ownership of Submerged
Lands With Some Federal Reservations.
Prior to 1947, it was assumed that the individual, coastal states held
title in fee to the lands beneath state waters.45 In United States v.
California, however, the United States Supreme Court held that
California did not own the submerged lands. Rather, the federal
government possessed "paramount rights" in the lands and waters.46
Subsequent to the California decision, the Court extended these federal
rights to all U.S. coastal submerged lands. 7 Debates concerning the
42. 944 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1991).
43. Id. at 1498. The Army Corps of Engineers argued that waterways once
navigable are always subject to the navigational servitude. A servitude attaches to a
navigable waterway and subsequent, unauthorized interference with the navigability of
the water may be barred by the servitude. The extremely limited power of state, local
or private interests to interfere with navigable waterways is analogous to state authority
to regulate commerce. The federal power over commerce exists even when the federal
government has not acted. State regulations discriminating against or unduly burdening
interstate commerce are commonly found unconstitutional. Id. at 1492-96. Full
discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause is beyond the scope of this Note. For
further information, see Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 4 DuKE L.J. 569 (1987).
44. Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d at 1498.
45. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 41-42 (1947) (Reed, I.,
dissenting) (reasoning that California owned the submerged lands by virtue of the equal
footing doctrine).
46. Id. at 36.
47. See United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950); United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 718-719 (1950).
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federal-state relationship flared and prompted legislative action. In 1953,
President Eisenhower signed the Submerged Lands Act into law,
returning ownership of submerged lands to the states."z
The Submerged Lands Act (SLA) of 1953 granted the individual
states title to, and the power to manage, lands beneath territorial
waters. 9 As a consequence, coastal states exercise complete regulatory
power over territorial waters with a few important exceptions. The SLA
explicitly preserves the federal navigational servitude' and the federal
right to preempt any state law impacting commerce, navigation,
international agreements, and national defense."
Although Congress reserved the servitude and particular regulatory
powers, the federal government's authority in these areas is not plenary.
Judicial interpretation of the SLA provides states with concurrent
jurisdiction over the waters above the submerged lands, permitting states
to regulate on navigational issues in the absence of federal legislation. 2
In Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Society v. Hawaii,53 the
district court stated that "[b]y itself, the SLA cannot sustain a claim of
preemption."' "[T]here is no Congressional intent to retain exclusive
jurisdiction over the navigable waters of the states and significant
48. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1315 (1994). 43 U.S.C. § 1311(b) states: "The United
States releases and relinquishes unto said States and persons aforesaid, except as
otherwise reserved herein, all right, title, and interest of the United States, if any it has,
in and to all said lands .... "
49. Id. See also, Murphy v. Dep't of Nat. Resources, 837 F. Supp. at 1223 (state
regulation of submerged lands necessarily includes control over the adjacent water
column).
"Territorial waters" generally describes the waters within three geographic miles
seaward of from a state's coastline. The SLA does not expressly use the term, but it
does recognize that a state's geographical limit is three miles. Additionally, the SLA
provides that it does not question or prejudice any claim of a state to the existence of a
prior geographical limit beyond the three mile mark. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994).
50. 43 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994). See also United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121,127
(1967) (construing § 1311(d) and § 1314 of the Submerged Lands Act).
51. 43 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994).
52. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.
California, 436 U.S. 32, 39 (1978); Murphy v. Dep't of Nat. Resources, 837 F. Supp.
at 1223).
53. 823 F. Supp. 766 (D. Haw. 1993), aff'd sub nom. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d
1185 (9th Cir. 1994).
54. Id. at 772.
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evidence to the contrary. "I Thus, the retention of federal exceptions
serves to authorize future governmental action, rather than to preclude
state action, within the specifically reserved fields.
C. The Constitutionality of Harbor Use and Mooring Fees
Both state and federal courts recognize the constitutional validity of
harbor usage and mooring fees. 6 Within the past fifteen years, three
disparate mooring fee statutes and ordinances have been legally
challenged.' In two of these three cases the plaintiffs charged that the
mooring fee structures violated the Equal Protection Clause."
Nevertheless, in all three challenges the deliberating courts upheld the fee
structures.
Broeckl v. Chicago Park District involved an equal protection
challenge to a Chicago park's disparate mooring fee ordinance. 9 The
park district argued that residents economically support the park through
local taxes and that the disparate fee simply equalized the cost burden
between residents and nonresidents.' The Illinois Supreme Court
55. Id. This proposition has been affirmed. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d at 1191
(stating that there is no federal preemption under the SLA unless and until the federal
government exercise its servitude power); Murphy v. Dep't of Nat. Resources, 837 F.
Supp. at 1221-1222 (citing Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Soc'y v. Hawaii,
823 F. Supp. at 772).
56. See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935) (permitting the
assessment of non-disparate harbor use fees); MacNeilv. Chicago Park Dist., 82 N.E.2d
452 (1I. 1948) (approving a Chicago park harbor fee based upon the length of the boat,
where the fee was graduated and applied equally to all persons seeking the use of the
facilities). But see Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893) (invalidating a Chicago
ordinance requiring a license fee for tugboats in the Chicago River).
57. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d at 1185; Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp.
Facilities, 651 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981); BroeckI v. Chicago Park Dist., 544 N.E.2d 792
(11. 1989).
LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675 (1st Cir. 1994), is the only
reported case involving a discriminatory harbor and waterway usage fee. Search of
WESTLAW, Federal Materials, ALLFEDS Database and State Materials, ALLSTATES
Database (Apr. 14, 1996).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. "No State shall. . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
59. Broeckl v. Chicago Park Dist., 544 N.E.2d at 796-797.
60. Id.
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applied rational basis scrutiny6 to the facts of the case and held that the
fee structure did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.' The court
relied upon Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n,' in order to dismiss the
plaintiff's argument.' In Baldwin, the United States Supreme Court held
that an elk hunting license fee that economically differentiated between
residents and nonresidents was an economic means not unreasonably
related to the preservation of the finite resource.' Similarly, the Broeckl
court characterized mooring facilities as a limited resource.' The court
stated that "[t]he differential in mooring fees reflects a reasonable
approach to equitably distribute the costs of providing these facilities,
and is founded on a rational basis."'
The federal courts have also affirmed the constitutional validity of
disparate mooring fees. In Hawaii Boating Association v. Wter
Transportation Facilities, the Ninth Circuit upheld a Hawaiian "live
aboard" and mooring fee statute that required nonresidents to pay higher
fees than residents." The only distinction between Broeckl and Hawaii
Boating Association is that the Hawaii Boating Association argued that
the disparate fee structure interfered with the fundamental right to travel,
thereby requiring a strict scrutiny standard of review. 9 In refusing to
apply strict scrutiny, the court stated "that the 'deprivation' involved in
this case-the failure to provide a berth in a recreational boat harbor at
the same rate as a resident-does not operate as a significant 'penalty' on
61. Id. Under rational basis scrutiny, a legislative classification withstands a
constitutional challenge so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest and
is not arbitrary, unreasonable or irrational. When applying the rational basis standard,
the courts must give deference to legislative determinations. LCM Enterprises v. Town
of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 679.
62. Broeckl v. Chicago Park Dist., 544 N.E.2d at 796-797.
63. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
64. Broeckl v. Chicago Park Dist., 544 N.E.2d at 796-797.
65. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm., 436 U.S. at 388-392.
66. Broeckl v. Chicago Park Dist., 544 N.E.2d at 796-797.
67. Id. at 797.
68. Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp. Facilities, 651 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
1981).
69. Id. at 664-666. In order for the courts to apply a strict scrutiny standard of
review, the challenge must involve, "a genuinely significant deprivation, such as a denial
of the basic 'necessities of life' . . . or the denial of a 'fundamental political right' . ...
Deprivations which are only uncomfortable are not enough. ... " Id. at 665 (quoting
Fisher v. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting)).
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the right to travel." 70 The federal court applied a rational basis standard
of review and relied upon Baldwin to reach the same conclusion as the
state court in Broeckl.7'
Barber v. State of Hawaii is the only reported disparate mooring fee
case not relying upon the Equal Protection Clause.' Instead, Barber
argued that the anchorage and mooring statute at issue violated the
dormant Commerce Clause.7' The Ninth Circuit relied upon Baldwin,
an equal protection decision, to dismiss the Commerce Clause
challenge.74 None of these recent disparate use fee cases charged that the
disparate fees violated the right to navigate or the federal navigational
servitude.
D. Pandanaram Harbor and the Dartmouth Wterways
Dartmouth's Padanaram Harbor is part of the waters of Buzzard's
Bay. The waterways and harbor are collectively considered to be the
town's prime asset and are utilized by various types of sail and motor
craft.75 Dartmouth's waterways and the Padanaram Harbor are navi-
gable 6 in their natural state and are home to commercial vessels.' The
70. Id. at 665.
71. Id. at 666.
72. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1994). This case was decided after
LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675 (1st Cir. 1994). Barber is the
most recently reported disparate mooring fee challenge. Search of WESTLAW Federal
Materials, ALLFEDS Database (Apr. 14, 1996).
The majority of the plaintiffs' challenges focused upon separate state regulations
concerning mooring privileges and not disparate fee structures. Barber v. Hawaii, 42
F.3d at 1185-1196.
73. Barberv. Hawaii, 42 F.3d at 1194. The plaintiffs in Barber did raise an equal
protection argument as well, but their case focused primarily on the dormant Commerce
Clause. Id. at 1194-1197.
74. Id. at 1194-1195. The court cited and quoted Baldwin v. Fish and Game
Comm'n in dismissing the plaintiffs' Commerce Clause argument. See supranotes 60-62
and accompanying text.
The court's analysis of the plaintiffs' challenge to the disparate fee structure focused
primarily on the Commerce Clause. The court brushed aside the plaintiffs' Equal
Protection Clause arguments without properly discussing them. Barber v. Hawaii, 42
F.3d at 1194-1197.
75. Verified Statement of Facts on Behalf of Defendants, at 1-2, LCM Enterprises
v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 9113129-WD (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 1993).
76. See supra notes 24, 33 and accompanying text.
77. The harbor's and waterways' physical and geographical characteristics bring
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waters and the harbor are subject to federal regulations and meet the
definition of navigability for the purposes of the navigational servitude.
In 1991, Dartmouth's Harbor Advisory Committee recommended
that the town adopt a waterways use fee schedule,78 due to the increased
use of the town waterways and harbor by nonresidential mariners.79 On
May 7, 1991, the Town adopted the recommendations of the committee
and created a Waterway Management Enterprise Fund, in accordance
with Massachusetts statute.' ° The local waterway usage fee is assessed
in addition to a state excise tax8' and local mooring fees.'
III. LCM EATERPRJSES V. TowN OF DARTMOUTH
A. District Court Ruling
In response to Dartmouth's disparate waterways use fee,' the
plaintiffs, LCM Enterprises and Robert R. Capobianco, paid the non-
resident fee under protest and filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts.' LCM Enterprises is a
the waters within the scope of the federal navigational servitude. Supra notes 30-34 and
accompanying text.
78. Supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 44 § 53 FA (West 1994). The statute enables a
town to establish a separate account classified as an "enterprise fund" for a "utility,
health care, recreational or transportation facility, and its operation. . . ." Id. The state
statute is silent as to the structure of the fees.
Moneys collected from the use fee are placed in the fund, and must be used solely
of funding the "salaries, operating expenses and capitol improvements to water-related
infrastructure." Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
at 3-4, LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WD (D. Mass. Apr. 27,
1993) (citing Certified Copies of Dartmouth's Annual Meeting.)
81. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. cl. 60B § 2(a) (West 1988). The tax is imposed, "for
the privilege of using the waterways of the commonwealth." Id.
The tax is assessed and levied by the municipalities. 60B M.G.L. § 2(a). The
funds must be used for waterways improvement and maintenance. 60B M.G.L. § 2).
All boat owners pay the sum, regardless of their residence. The fee is non-disparate: all
boat owners are treated equally. 60B M.G.L. § 2(b).
82. Plaintiffs pay $2,450 in rental slip fees to the New Bedford Yacht Club. LCM
Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1994).
83. See article IV, section 19B, subsection25 of Dartmouth's By-Laws, supra note
10.
84. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WD (D. Mass. Apr.
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Delaware holding company which owns a fifty foot boat. Plaintiff
Robert C. Capobianco is president of LCM Enterprises, a resident of
Still River, Massachusetts, and owner of a fifteen foot boat. Both
vessels use the Dartmouth waterways, and maintain a slip at a private
facility within the Padanaram Harbor.' Plaintiffs brought suit against
the Town of Dartmouth and the members of the municipal Waterways
Advisory Committee.
Plaintiffs asserted that Dartmouth's disparate use fee ordinance
impermissibly regulated the waterways.86 LCM and Capobianco alleged
that the disparate use fee violated three constitutional provisions; the
Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Commerce
Clause.' Both parties moved for summary judgment."
On April 27, 1993, the district court granted the town's motion for
summary judgment based on three conclusions. First, the plaintiffs did
not have standing to raise the Commerce Clause claim.89 Second, the
use fee scheme did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The fee
structure was rationally related to the town's "legitimate legislative goal
namely, the equitable distribution of the growing costs of those harbor
services and facilities that benefit residents and nonresidents alike."'
Finally, the due process claim failed for the same reasons as the equal
protection claim.9
The district court judge challenged LCM's Commerce Clause claim
during the summary judgment hearing.' Plaintiffs' counsel argued that
27, 1993).
85. Memorandum inSupport of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgement at 2,4,
LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WD (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 1993).
86. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 683.
87. Id. at 683.
88. Id.
89. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WD, Memorandum
and Order at 6,7 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 1993).
90. Id. at 14-15.
91. Id. at 15.
92. The exchange between the court and plaintiffs' attorney was as follows:
THE COURT: Does it [the LCM Enterprise vessel at issue] do any interstate
commerce?
MR. PETRUZZIELLO: No, not that I'm aware of.
THE COURT: So, how can you raise an interstate commerce claim? Mr.
Capobianco doesn't do any interstate commerce.
MR. PETRUZZIELLO: Not at present, no .... I have raised the interstate
commerce question because of the way that the Dartmouth law was drafted, it
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LCM's ownership of the vessel could be considered to be engaged in
interstate commerce, in that it has to pay yearly fees to Delaware and
moors in Dartmouth.' However, plaintiffs' counsel conceded, "[t]hat's
not the best argument in this case."' The district court ruled that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to raise the Commerce Clause issue.9'
The judge characterized the Commerce Clause as protecting "the right
of persons 'to engage in interstate trade free from restrictive state
regulation.'" ' The plaintiffs, through their Commerce Clause claim,
could not be "'assert[ing their] own legal rights and interests.'"'
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's Decision to grant summary
judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
heard the appeal.
B. On Appeal
On appeal, LCM made several arguments." First, LCM challenged
the district court's application of the rational basis scrutiny." Appellants
argued that the lower court should have applied a strict scrutiny standard
of review because Dartmouth's disparate use fee violated the fundamental
right to travel."o
can affect interstate commerce.
THE COURT: Yes, it can for other people, but you're not the proper plaintiff
to bring that.
Hearing Before the Honorable Douglas P. Woodluck at 2-3, LCM Enterprises v. Town
of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WID (D. Mass. heard Dec. 10, 1992).
93. Id at 3.
94. Id.
95. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WD, Memorandum
and Order at 7 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 1993).
96. Id. at 6 (citation omitted) (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448
(1991)).
97. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, No. 91-13129-WD, Memorandum
and Order at 6 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (emphasis added)).
The court continued: "Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs were engaged in some form of
commercial activity, they would still be unable to assert their own legal rights through
a Commerce Clause claim unless they were first able to show that such activity had
interstate repercussions." Id. at 6-7.
98. Although the both parties moved for summary judgment in the district court,
on appeal, LCM challenged the lower court's "implicit conclusion that there are no
disputed issues of material fact to justify summary judgment." LCM Enterprises v.
Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 678.
99. Id. at 679.
100. Id. LCM argued that strict scrutiny applies when a fundamental right is at
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Second, appellants claimed that even if strict scrutiny did not apply,
the district court failed to recognize that Dartmouth's disparate fee was
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental goal. Dartmouth's use
fee caused nonresidents to contribute a greater amount as a means to
lessen the burden on residents.'"' LCM argued that Dartmouth's use fee
was distinguishable from cases upholding permissible disparate use
fees.' 2
Third, appellants argued that they contributed an equal share of the
harbor costs absent the nonresidential fee.' Payment of the Mass-
achusetts boat excise tax' 4 and slip rental fee to the New Bedford Yacht
Club"a covered the shortfall in harbor costs.
Finally, appellants advanced the theory that the disparate fee
constituted an impermissible regulation of the waterways.' LCM
contended that the actions of the town violated the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution.'
Conversely, Dartmouth argued that the district court was correct in
concluding that the differing use fee was rationally related "to the goal
of 'fairly distributing harbor costs to all users' and thus equalizing the
otherwise disproportionate burdens between residents and nonresidents
of maintaining the harbor."'" Additionally, the town argued that the
decision to treat the renters of boat slips differently than renters of
residential property did not arise to the level of impermissible discrimina-
tion to trigger strict scrutiny."°
The First Circuit held that the Dartmouth waterways ordinance that
charged a disparate usage fees on resident and nonresident vessel owners
issue. See supra note 66.
101. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 679-680.
102. Id. Appellants claimed that the nonresidents in two cases, Baldwin v. Fish
and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. at 388-91, and Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp.
Facilities, 651 F.2d at 664-666, did not contribute to the state other than through the
imposition of the fee. LCM contributed additional sums to the state and to the town
through the payment of state excise tax and slip rental fees. LCM Enterprises v. Town
of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 679-680.
103. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 681.
104. See supra note 79.
105. See supra note 80.
106. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 683. LCM also argued
that the local legislation was preempted by federal regulations. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 679.
109. Id. at 682-83.
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was constitutional. "I The court found that the town passed the ordinance
for the legitimate governmental purpose of dissipating the financial
burden carried by resident boaters."' LCM Enterprises failed to meet
their burden in proving that the disparate fee violated a fundamental
right" and that the fee was unreasonable in its application. The court
relied upon Baldwin to dismiss the appellants unreasonableness
argument." 3 Due to judicial deference to legislative decisions of state
and local governments under the Equal Protection Clause's rational basis
standard of review, the court avoided a detailed analysis of the empirical
data.i14
The court quickly dismissed LCM's Commerce Clause arguments,
stating that the appellants lacked standing to raise the argument. 15
Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the Town of Dartmouth.
IV. DISCUSSION
LCM Enterprises follows the analysis of federal and state court
decisions upholding disparate mooring and anchorage fee statutes."'
Dartmouth's disparate use fee, however, differs in that it is assessed not
for the rental of a mooring, but rather for the navigational use of Dart-
mouth's waters." 7  The LCM Enterprises decision does not explicitly
recognize this distinction. In the wake of the LCM Enterprises, the
question becomes whether individual, recreational mariners faced with
discriminatory local waterways regulations are left with a way to protect
their right to navigate.
110. Id. at 683.
111. Id. at 680-81.
112. Id. at 679 n.4. The court held that the fundamental right to travel is not
burdened by the ordinance because boaters mooring their boats in the harbor for short
periods of time are not subject to the fee. Id.
113. Id. at 680-682.
114. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
115. LCM Enterprises v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d at 683. At oral argument,
appellants conceded that they did not have standing under the Commerce Clause. Id. at
683 n.4.
Additionally, the court determined that LCM failed to show any conflict between
federal waterways law and state and local laws. Id. at 683.
116. See supra section II(C) and accompanying notes.
117. See supra note 10.
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In LCM Enterprises, plaintiffs did not directly challenge the use fees
as an interference with the federally recognized right to navigate but
rather concentrated upon an equal protection argument.' 18 LCM's equal
protection claim's success was dependent upon the court's application of
a strict scrutiny level of review. This argument failed because plaintiffs
were unable to persuade the court that there was any fundamental right
involved. The plaintiffs might have been more successful by focusing on
the federal policy of protecting the public right to navigation through the
use of the navigational servitude."1 Plaintiffs should have argued that
the disparate use fee violated the dormant navigational servitude.'"
According to the Boone court, in order to advance the dormant
navigational servitude argument, LCM would have the burden of proving
three elements. First, plaintiffs must establish two forms of standing.
LCM must have standing under the Commerce Clause." Additionally,
plaintiffs would have to convince the court that a private party has
standing to exercise a governmental power.' Second, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that Dartmouth's waterways meet the navigational servi-
tude's "navigability" requirement.' Third, LCM would have to prove
the existence of an impediment to navigation.'
The federally recognized right to navigate and the navigational
servitude extend through the Commerce Clause."z Thus, private parties
must argue for judicial recognition of standing under the Commerce
Clause. LCM erroneously conceded a lack of standing under the
Commerce Clause. Reviewing the source of the navigational power
evidences that the plaintiffs might have had standing to raise the
navigational arguments. 26 Additionally, judicial precedent indicates that
118. See suprasectionlll(A). One explanationfor the plaintiffs' non-reliance upon
the right to navigate is that it is not a fundamental right. "Mhis Court is unaware of
any case that has employed a strict-scrutiny analysis inaddressing the right to navigation,
hindrances to navigation, or navigation under the SLA." Murphy v. Dep't of Nat.
Resources, 837 F. Supp. at 1220.
119. See supra note 31.
120. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
123. See supranotes 32-34 and accompanying text. Due to the fact that the town's
waters meet the navigational servitude's "navigability" requirements, this prong of the
potential navigational servitude argument is not discussed within this section.
124. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
126. Plaintiffs should have informed the judge of the origins of the right to navigate
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the plaintiffs might have been able to maintain standing to raise the
navigational servitude even though the servitude is viewed as a
governmental power. 27
The First Circuit correctly recognized that the navigable waters of
the United States cannot be obstructed to impair the public right to
navigation." However, the court then stated that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that the disparate use fees interfered with access to
Dartmouth's navigable waters.'29 Yet, the use fee makes a patent,
economic distinction between the residents and the nonresidents. In
order for nonresidents to enjoy the frequent use of the harbor and the
waterways, they are forced to pay a larger fee than nonresidents.
Because of this, it can be argued that the fee economically interferes with
nonresidents' right to navigate. An analogy could be made to judicial
treatment of state and local regulations which discriminate against out-of-
state interests and burden the flow of commerce."3
Although anchorage and mooring regulations are normally regarded
as a matter of local concern, 3' plaintiffs could bolster their argument by
offering evidence of the SLA's explicit reservation of the federal
navigational servitude, as well as the government's continued practice of
protecting public access. The federal government has continually used the
servitude as a means to protect this access." These federal governmen-
and its relationship to the Commerce Clause. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying
text.
127. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. But see supra note 40.
128. LCM Enterprises v. Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675, 683 (lst Cir. 1994).
129. Id.
130. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (striking down
a Iowa statute regulating double trailer trucks). See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. 299 (1851) (upholding local navigational regulation of the navigable waters of
the United States which treated nonresidents and residents equally).
Under a negative Commerce Clause analysis, even in instances where the federal
government has not acted under the Commerce Clause, courts generally strike down state
actions which are improperly designed to confer economic benefits to the residents of that
state at the expense of nonresidents. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. at
669-671.
131. There are no reported cases involving government use of the servitude as a
means to protect mooring or anchorage facilities. Search of WESTLAW, Federal
Materials, ALLFEDS Database (Apr. 14, 1996). Thus, by analogy to the dormant
Commerce Clause, there is an implicit recognition that the federal government views
anchorage and mooring regulations as a local concern, thereby encouraging local
legislation on the matter.
132. See Morrale, supra note 17, at 9-12.
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tal actions demonstrate an intent by the federal government to protect the
public right to navigation.
There are counter arguments to this dormant navigational servitude
argument. Although the literal language of nineteenth and early
twentieth century Supreme Court decisions addressing navigational issues
applies to mariners involved in recreational navigation, courts may be
unwilling to extend broad navigational protections to all recreational
boaters. However, LCM's pursuit of the navigational servitude argument
would have forced the court to address the scope of recreational mariners
rights and the limits of state and local governments authority to regulate
recreational navigation. LCM's reliance upon the equal protection
argument permitted the court to apply settled law to this new issue. A
definition of the scope of recreational navigational rights would be
helpful in view of the increasing amounts of state and local navigational
legislation. Thus, in the wake of LCM Enterprises, the scope of
recreational boaters right to navigate remains unknown.
V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the plaintiffs' arguments, the First Circuit correctly
upheld Dartmouth's waterways usage fee, charging nonresidents over
twice as much as residents. However, the power of LCM Enterprises
should not be overestimated. The decision does not address the scope of
the federally recognized right to navigate and the extent of the federal
governmental power over navigation. A better prepared plaintiff might
have directly challenged the disparate use fee as a violation of the right
to navigate, and might have also asserted the dormant navigational
servitude. Thus, LCM Enterprises may not actually provide state and
local governments with powerful authority to freely levy fees against
recreational mariners for the use of the public navigable waters.
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